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This paper investigates the relationship between economic complexity, a 
measure of economic structures, and income inequality. Using cross-country 
OLS regression analysis, we show that countries with economic structures 
geared toward complex products enjoy a lower level of inequality. Human 
capital is found to magnify this correlation. Different measures of human 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1950s, there has been an intense discussion on the relationship between economic 
development and income inequality, following the path-breaking paper of Kuznets (Kuznets, 
1955). This line of research attempts to verify empirically the well-known inverted U-shaped 
“Kuznets curve”. But findings remain inconclusive, with some papers providing empirical 
support for the Kuznets hypothesis (Ahluwalia, 1976; Barro, 2008), others finding support for 
only the downward sloping part of the curve (Perotti, 1996; Galbraith, 2007; Palma, 2011), and 
still others refuting the systematic relationship between economic growth and the level of 
income inequality (Deininger and Squire, 1996).  
A glaring limitation of the above strand of literature is that scholars have typically made 
use of aggregate indicators of economic development, such as GDP or the total contribution of 
agriculture, manufacturing or services to GDP (Hartmann et al., 2017). Economists, however, 
contend that an aggregate monetary measure of economic size is an inadequate proxy for 
economic development when it comes to explaining variations in income inequality (Kuznets, 
1973; Stiglitz et al., 2010; Sbardella et al., 2017; Hartmann et al., 2017). The basic reasoning 
is that they ignore the conventional wisdom about the heterogeneous economic outcomes, 
depending on what a country produces and exports. Because these indicators are calculated 
based upon broad categories, they fail to capture effectively the complexity level of 
production.1 By contrast, economic performance is not necessarily uniform across a diverse 
range of products, which justifies a disaggregated approach. 
Indeed, the relationship between a country’s economic structures, reflecting what it 
produces and exports, and economic growth and income inequality, has long been recognized 
in the literature. Specifically, Lewis (1955), Rostow (1959), Kuznets and Murphy (1966), 
Kaldor (1967) and Chenery and Taylor (1968), among others, emphasize the role of economic 
transformation, that is the process of moving from activities with lower productivity to those 
with higher productivity. Accordingly, specialization in different activities is associated with 
differentiated economic outcomes. Countries whose economic structures are geared toward 
sophisticated commodities develop faster than those specializing in simple products (Felipe et 
al., 2012).   
                                                          
1 See Hartmann et al. (2017) for more discussions.  
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This paper departs from the current literature by investigating the relationship between 
economic complexity and income inequality. We build upon the recent literature which argues 
that income distribution depends not only on economic growth but also on the type of growth 
(Hartmann et al., 2017). This line of research calls for better measures of economic 
development, rather than an aggregated indicator of income (Costanza et al., 2009; Stiglitz et 
al., 2010). Accordingly, economic development involves not only increases in economic size, 
but also brings about variations in technologies, human capital, and institutions, etc. All these 
factors are defined as non-tradeable capabilities, which determine a country’s productivity 
level (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). They are captured in the economic complexity index, 
which measures productive capabilities embedded in economic structures. The index is 
constructed based on the method proposed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). An economy is 
complex if it can produce a diverse range of products (diversity) that are not widely produced 
by many countries (ubiquity). Complexity reveals information about a country’s human capital, 
technology, and institutions. It is strongly correlated with economic performance (Hausmann 
et al., 2007; Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). Nevertheless, little is known about the extent to 
which complexity affects income inequality. 
Examining the relationship between economic complexity and inequality, our study 
contributes to the literature in several dimensions. First, we employ an extended dataset of 
income inequality with the broadest coverage of countries and years to examine the 
distributional effects of economic complexity. Second, we demonstrate that countries with 
higher economic complexity enjoy a lower level of inequality, using cross-country OLS 
regression. Furthermore, human capital magnifies this negative correlation. Breaking down the 
sample based on a country’s income level, we find that secondary education and tertiary 
education have differentiated interaction effects on inequality. We also note that this strong 
correlation does not necessarily imply causality due to endogeneity concerns. Third, we 
estimate a dynamic panel data model, using a system GMM estimator that caters for the 
potential endogeneity bias. We differ from previous research by separating the short- and 
longer-run effects of complexity on inequality. An immediate and a longer-term increase in 
complexity is found to worsen income distribution. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section discusses economic complexity and its 
relationship with income inequality. Next, we present our econometric methods. The fourth 
section examines empirical findings. The study concludes by summarizing the main results.  
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2. Economic complexity and income inequality 
2.1. What is economic complexity? 
Economic complexity, as constructed by Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009), is a measure of the 
set of productive capabilities available in a country. Here, capabilities are defined as non-
tradeable inputs required to make a product (Hidalgo and Hausmann, 2009). These inputs, for 
instance, include human capital, technology, institutions, and the legal system. At the firm 
level, capabilities encompass the set of “know-how” or working practices, which are created 
when individuals interact and work closely together in a group. Broadly speaking, capabilities 
at firm level capture the organizational capacity, associated with the formation, management, 
and operation of production activities (Felipe et al., 2012). The diversity of these capabilities, 
as measured by economic complexity, determines a country’s productivity level. Thus, 
economic complexity helps explain cross-country divergence in income per capita (Hidalgo 
and Hausmann, 2009).  
Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009) construct an economic complexity index based on the so-
called “Method of Reflections”. First, the authors calculate the Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) index to determine whether a country is effectively exporting a given 
product.2 Second, they define two concepts, “diversity” and “ubiquity”, as the number of 
products a country can export with RCA and the number of countries that have an advantage 
in exporting a given product, respectively. Third, a country is considered to be complex if it 
can export a diverse range of products with RCA (high diversity) while a product is viewed as 
complex if it is not exported popularly by many countries (low ubiquity). The basic reasoning 
is that producing a given commodity requires the set of productive capabilities. Hence, the 
diversity of these capabilities is revealed by the number of products a country exports with 
RCA. At the same time, complex products that require many hard-to-find capabilities are 
exported by only few countries. Finally, economic complexity is obtained by combining 
information on country diversity and product ubiquity. A country is complex if it can export a 
diverse range of products (high diversity) and their products are not popularly exported by 
other countries (low ubiquity). 
The calculation can be shown below, following Hidalgo and Hausmann (2009). 
                                                          
2 The RCA indicator, developed by Balassa (1965), is the ratio of the share of a country’s exports of a 
given product in the total export basket to the overall share across countries. A country is considered as 
a significant exporter of a given commodity if its RCA is greater than or equal to unity(𝑅𝐶𝐴 ≥ 1). 
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𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌 = 𝑘𝑐,0 = ∑ 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑝                                                            [1] 
𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝑇𝑌 = 𝑘𝑝,0 = ∑ 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝            𝑐                                                  [2]    
where c stands for the country, p denotes the commodity. RCAcp is an indicator variable, taking 
the value of 1 if a country has a revealed comparative advantage in product p, and 0 otherwise.  
However, these two indicators, considered separately, are imprecise measures of economic 
complexity. For instance, a country may export a diverse range of products, simply because of 
its economic size. In this case, product diversity may provide biased information on the 
availability of capabilities within a country. To address this bias, Hidalgo and Hausmann 
(2009) propose the method of reflection to calculate economic complexity by computing jointly 
and iteratively the mean value of the diversity and ubiquity, calculated in the previous iteration. 
The formulae can be represented as follow. 
 𝑘𝑐,𝑁 =
1
𝑘𝑐,0
∑ 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑝,𝑁−1𝑝           [3] 
𝑘𝑝,𝑁 =
1
𝑘𝑝,0
∑ 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑘𝑐,𝑁−1 𝑐          [4] 
where N stands for the number of iterations.  
Substituting Eq. [4] into [3], we obtain the following equation (Hausmann et al., 2014). 
 𝑘𝑐,𝑁 =
1
𝑘𝑐,0
∑ 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝
1
𝑘𝑝,0
𝑝
∑ 𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐′𝑝. 𝑘𝑐′,𝑁−2
𝑐′
= ∑ 𝑘𝑐′,𝑁−2
𝑐′
∑
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐′𝑝
𝑘𝑐,0𝑘𝑝,0
𝑝
 
This can be rewritten as: 
 𝑘𝑐,𝑁 = ∑ ?̃?𝑐𝑐′
𝑐′
𝑘𝑐′,𝑁−2 
in which  
?̃?𝑐𝑐′ = ∑
𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐𝑝𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑐′𝑝
𝑘𝑐,0𝑘𝑝,0
𝑝
 
M̃cc′ is basically a matrix connecting countries exporting similar products. To discount 
common products, the matrix is weighted by the inverse of the ubiquity of a product. Then it 
is normalized by the diversity of a country (Hartmann et al., 2017).  
Finally, economic complexity is computed as: 
𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑐 =
𝐾𝑐 − 〈𝐾〉
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝐾)
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where Kc is the eigenvector of M̃cc′, associated with the second largest eigenvalue. The vector 
associated with the largest eigenvalue is a vector of ones (Hausmann et al., 2014; Caldarelli et 
al., 2012).  
2.2. Why does economic complexity matter for income inequality? 
Hartmann et al. (2017) is the only paper that documents a relationship between economic 
complexity and income inequality. Using OLS and panel fixed-effects regression, the authors 
demonstrate that economic complexity lowers income inequality. Diverging from this study, 
we show that countries with higher economic complexity enjoy a lower level of inequality, but 
an increase in complexity is associated with higher inequality within a country. 
First, there are several mechanisms by which economic complexity improves a country’s 
income distribution. Individuals living in a complex economy have more employment and 
occupational opportunities, and a vast majority of disseminated skills and knowledge 
(Hartmann, 2014). Economic structures geared toward a diverse range of sophisticated 
products are associated with a relatively flat occupational structure (Hartmann et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, workers in complex industries have higher bargaining power, lowering income 
disparity. Complex economic structures are also associated with better institutions and higher 
unionization, which reduces income inequality (Hartmann, 2014). 
Considering a country whose economic structures are geared toward simple commodities 
(e.g., raw materials and agricultural products), inequality tends to proliferate because of the 
following reasons. First, the income of the majority of workers in this country depends on 
economic activities characterized by decreasing returns to scale and low productivity. By 
contrast, a small fraction of the population enjoys a higher income, stemming from limited 
activities with higher productivity. Second, the diffusion of limited knowledge and skills would 
be occupied by small groups of individuals, leaving them with an economic premium. Third, 
individuals at the bottom of the income distribution are constrained by limited learning and 
occupational opportunities. This further increases the income gap. Finally, the presence of one 
main sector producing primary commodities is associated with a vertical hierarchy in the 
occupational structure to manage a huge cadre of unskilled labors. By contrast, complex 
economic structures, characterized by products with increasing returns to scale, lower 
inequality by enhancing the lifetime earnings of workers who produce them (Constantine, 
2017). A diverse range of opportunities also provides the poor with several means of moving 
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up in the social stratification (Hidalgo, 2015; Hartmann et al., 2017). Therefore, economic 
complexity helps to lower income inequality.  
Second, we argue that an increase in economic complexity can be associated with a higher 
level of inequality within a country. When economic structures become more complex, there 
appears a growing demand for qualified workers (Constantine, 2017). This is attributable to 
changes in the set of required capabilities (Hodgson, 2003). Specifically, this process results in 
some new capabilities emerging and becoming increasingly essential, in accordance with the 
growing richness of the complex economy. This is described as a creative-destruction process, 
which leads to the emergence of new sectors and the disappearance of traditional ones 
(Hartmann, 2014). In this process, workers may find it difficult to alter from one specialism to 
another (Hartmann, 2014). There would be opportunities for the low-income group to climb up 
the career ladder, but continual retraining would be of great importance in acquiring 
remunerative employment. It is much easier and less costly for skilled workers to advance 
because they are endowed with greater capabilities. Skilled workers with the capacity to adapt 
to the changing sets of capabilities eventually secure an improved economic premium and 
become active agents in society. For this reason, we argue that growing economic complexity 
benefits skilled workers more than unskilled workers, exacerbating the income gap within a 
country.  
 Finally, we suppose that human capital magnifies the negative correlation between 
economic complexity and inequality. Specifically, human capital plays an important role in 
tackling inequality when a country experiences structural transformation toward complex 
industries. Endogenous growth theory, attempting to explain cross-country income disparities, 
observes that human capital is an essential determinant of growth (Romer, 2012). Furthermore, 
the literature has long acknowledged that economic development is the process of structural 
change in a country’s productive structures (Rostow, 1959; Lewis, 1955). This occurs through 
resource transformation from simple to complex industries, achieved by accumulating new 
productive capabilities. In this process, human capital allows a country to learn and acquire 
more capabilities faster. Consequently, human capital helps a country to engage in the 
production of sophisticated commodities, thereby enhancing its economic complexity (Hidalgo 
and Hausmann, 2009; Hausmann et al., 2014). Improvements in education also allow 
individuals to take advantage of diverse opportunities due to growing economic complexity. It, 
therefore, lowers the possibility that complexity worsens a country’s income distribution due 
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to skill-bias. Hence, we argue that human capital is the key factor that intertwines with 
economic complexity in affecting income inequality.  
3. Econometric models 
3.1. Cross-country models 
A cross-country model is used to test the hypothesis that more complex economies have more 
equal income distribution. We calculate the average value for each variable across the period 
from 1980 to 2014 to obtain cross-sectional data for 96 countries.3 The dependent variable is 
the Gini coefficient, a measure of the income inequality level. This index is estimated using 
post-tax, post-transfer measures of household income in the Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database. The main variable of interest, economic complexity, is taken from MIT’s 
Observatory of Economic Complexity (atlas.media.mit.edu).  
First, income inequality is regressed on economic complexity, controlling for the level of 
income, its square, years of schooling, population, trade openness, and FDI. The model 
specification is expressed as: 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  [5] 
where i stands for country i, 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 represents the Gini coefficient for disposable income, 𝐸𝐶𝐼 
represents the Economic Complexity index, 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 and 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑄 are the natural log of 
GDP per capita and its squared term, respectively, 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 denotes years of schooling, 𝑋 is 
a vector of other control variables, 𝜀 represents the error term.  
Second, the effects of economic complexity on income inequality are conditional on human 
capital, as argued earlier. Therefore, an additional model is specified, including interaction 
terms between economic complexity and different measures of human capital. The model 
specification is presented below. 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐸𝐶𝐼 ×
𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖              [6] 
As the results show in the following section, most of the control variables included in Eq. [5] 
are statistically insignificant. The basic reasoning is that some of the distributional effect of 
those factors (e.g., trade openness and FDI) may be captured by ECI. Hence, we do not include 
                                                          
3 Data for years of schooling are available for only 96 countries. Hence, the number of observations 
drops to 96 when it is included in the model.  
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them in Eq. [6] and [7]. However, our conclusions remain largely insensitive to including those 
variables. 
Finally, we estimate Eq. [6] using two different samples, based on the level of income, to 
test whether different measures of human capital have differentiated effects in developing and 
developed countries. 
Estimating Eq. [5] and [6] requires some attention to reverse causality that may run from 
income inequality to economic complexity. A higher level of income inequality impedes the 
development of education, health outcomes, investment, and social consensus (Persson and 
Tabellini, 1994; Benabou, 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Easterly, 2007; Berg and Ostry, 
2013). In addition, economic complexity is a correlate of a country’s innovative outcomes, its 
increasing innovative capacity, and the implementation of those innovations (Sweet and 
Eterovic Maggio, 2015). A high level of income inequality, which deters economic 
development, can also lower the innovation creation process by limiting the demand for 
innovative products and services (Zweimüller, 2000). We may well think that income 
inequality may impede the incentives for innovation. These are essential for a country to obtain 
new productive capabilities, which allow it to engage in more sophisticated production 
activities. Thus, the estimates of causal effects of complexity on inequality may reflect reverse 
causation. This potential bias is ignored by Hartmann et al. (2017), which is the only study 
linking complexity and inequality. The consistency of estimates requires using an instrumental 
variable that affects income inequality only through economic complexity. This is a 
challenging task, given that the main determinants of economic complexity have direct effects 
on income inequality (e.g., government consumption, the abundance of arable land, and capital 
per worker).4 This motivates us to estimate a dynamic panel data model in the following 
section. 
In short, we estimate Eq. [5] and [6] using OLS, albeit recognizing that some endogeneity 
bias may exist. Hence, the strong correlation between economic complexity and income 
inequality, as demonstrated later, may not necessarily imply causality.   
3.2. A dynamic panel data model 
To test the effects of an increase in economic complexity on income inequality in a dynamic 
model, this section analyses an unbalanced panel dataset, comprising 113 countries with 5-year 
                                                          
4 See Daude et al. (2016) and Zhu and Fu (2013). 
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averages from 1965 to 2014. The motivation for taking 5-year averages for all time-variant 
variables is that we can reduce short-run fluctuations due to business cycles. In addition, our 
main variables of interest, including economic complexity, GDP and inequality, change slowly 
year-over-year. This paper follows Blundell and Bond (1998) to estimate the following model. 
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡        [7] 
where i denotes country i (i=1, 2,…113). The time dimension runs from 1 to 10, denoting 10 
periods of 5-year averages from 1965 to 2014. GINIit represents the disposable income Gini 
coefficients of country i in period t. GINIit−1 reflects the dynamic characteristics of the 
model. Schoolingit is years of schooling of country i in period t.
5 Populationit is the total 
population; δi is the country fixed effects; γt stands for time effects; εit is the error term; and 
β is the vector of estimated coefficients.6 
The reason why we include lagged inequality as an explanatory variable in Eq. [7] is that 
aggregate indicators, such as GDP or inequality, exhibit high time persistence. Indeed, serial 
correlation of income inequality across time has been well established in the literature 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2003; Kurita and Kurosaki, 2011). This motivates us to estimate a linear 
dynamic panel data.7 
We include both current and lagged economic complexity to capture the short- and long-
run effects of an increase in economic complexity on income inequality.8 In particular, the 
current economic complexity reflects the distributional effects of an immediate increase in 
economic complexity. We also compute the long-run effects, following Wooldridge (2013, 
page 635). It is necessary to conduct formal tests of selecting the appropriate lag length of ECI 
when calculating the long-run effect. However, this task is challenging given that our time-
                                                          
5 Data for years of schooling is obtained from Barro and Lee (2013), but this data is available at 5-year 
intervals. Therefore, we assigned the educational data at the beginning year of every period. For 
instance, data on years of schooling in 1965 will be used for the first period (1965-1969), and data on 
years of schooling in 2010 will be used for the final period (2010 -2014). Years of schooling represent 
the stock of human capital, accumulated over every 5 years. Hence, we can match them with 5-year 
averages data to estimate Eq. [7].  
6 Unlike the OLS models, the panel data models do not include institutional variables because data is 
relatively sparse.  
7 Income inequality varies slowly within countries over years. This suggests that there exist some 
unobserved factors explaining this time persistence. In this case, fixed-effects estimates are biased if 
these factors are correlated with our explanatory variables. Addressing this issue requires including the 
past income inequality levels as an explanatory variable.  
8 We sincerely thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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series dimension is relatively short. We also tried including the second and third lag of ECI, 
and the estimated coefficients are positive but statistically insignificant. Including further lags 
of ECI also results in the model suffering from instrument proliferation when we have too many 
endogenous regressors. For these reasons, we include only a one-period lag of ECI. 
Estimation of Eq. [7] requires the following issues to be addressed. First, the lagged 
dependent variable, included as an explanatory variable, is endogenous. Second, estimating the 
distributional effects of economic complexity, GDP, and human capital suffers from 
endogeneity bias due to measurement errors, omitted variable bias, and reverse causality, as 
argued earlier. The solution to these problems is to use an exogenous instrument that needs to 
satisfy the exclusion restrictions. However, this is a challenging task as we discussed in the 
previous section. Motivated by this issue, we estimate Eq. [7] using internal instruments, which 
are the higher order lags of our endogenous variables.9  
Arellano and Bond (1991) propose the use of first differences of the variables to remove 
bias arising from unobserved country heterogeneity. The first difference equation can be 
expressed as follows. 
        ∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3∆𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + ∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡   [8] 
in which ∆ stands for the first difference operator. It is easy to recognize that ∆GINIit−1 is 
endogenous in this case because  
𝐸(∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐸[(𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−2)(𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1)] ≠ 0 
Under the assumption that the error terms in Eq. [7] are serially uncorrelated 
(cov(εi,t, εi,t−j) = 0 if j ≠ 0), the moment conditions for the difference GMM is specified as 
follows 
                       𝐸[𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−𝑗∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 for 𝑡 = 3,4, … 𝑇 and 𝑗 ≥ 2                      [9] 
Hence, two periods or further lags of the dependent variable are valid instruments for 
∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 in Eq. [8].
10 
We apply the same logic to address the second problem caused by reverse causality 
running from inequality to complexity. Under the assumption that 𝐸[𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑗] ≠ 0 for 𝑗 ≤
𝑡 and 𝐸[𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡𝜀𝑖,𝑗] = 0 for 𝑗 > 𝑡, the moment condition is specified as 
𝐸[𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡−𝑗∆𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 for 𝑡 = 3,4, … 𝑇 and 𝑗 ≥ 2                                 [10] 
                                                          
9 We treat all variables on the right-hand side, except population, as endogenous variables.   
10 See Arellano and Bond (1991) for more detailed discussions.  
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Hence, two periods or further lags of economic complexity are valid instruments for both 
∆ECIi,t and ∆ECIi,t−1. The difference GMM employs two sets of moment condition [9] and 
[10] to estimate Eq. [7] 
However, the difference estimation method suffers from the problem of weak instruments, 
given the high time-persistence of the dependent variable and the short time dimension 
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This problem can be addressed by using 
the system GMM estimator, developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The basic idea is that we 
specify additional moment conditions by adding the level form equation to the difference 
equation. The lagged differences of the explanatory variables are used as instruments for the 
equations in levels. The additional moment conditions can be described as below: 
𝐸[∆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 for 𝑡 = 3,4, … 𝑇      [11] 
𝐸[∆𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1𝜀𝑖,𝑡] = 0 for 𝑡 = 3,4, … 𝑇                [12] 
In short, the system GMM employs the moment conditions [9], [10], [11], and [12] to 
estimate Eq. [7]. Because our dependent variable is time persisting, as discussed above, the 
system GMM estimator is more suitable. Furthermore, it can address the potential endogeneity 
of our variables by using appropriate lags of endogenous variables as valid instruments. 
Finally, we perform several specification tests to check the validity of our results. First, 
the Arellano-Bond AR(2) test is used to test the absence of second-order autocorrelation. 
Failure to reject the null of the AR(2) test implies no autocorrelation in the second-differenced 
errors, validating the moment conditions. In this case, we can perform the system GMM 
estimation without changing the instrument sets. By contrast, rejection of the null of the AR(2) 
test supports the presence of autocorrelation in the error term of order one or higher. This 
requires re-estimating the models using further lags (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). For this 
reason, we perform the Arellano-Bond AR(3) test to check the absence of third-order 
autocorrelation in the error term. Failure to reject the null validates our instruments used in the 
modified system GMM estimator. Second, we check the Hansen J-test of over-identifying 
restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the over-identifying restrictions are valid, of which the 
failure to reject substantiates the overall validity of the instruments and the model. Furthermore, 
the system GMM estimator may suffer from instrument proliferation problems because it 
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employs a larger set of instruments, relative to difference GMM. We solve this problem by 
limiting the number of lags of the endogenous variables.11 
4. Results and discussions 
4.1. OLS estimation 
The OLS estimation results are presented in Table 1 to Table 3. We find a strong negative 
effect of economic complexity on income inequality. It can be observed from Table 1 that the 
estimated coefficients of economic complexity are negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level in all models. This means that countries whose productive structures are more 
complex have a lower level of income inequality, ceteris-paribus. This empirical finding is in 
line with the OLS estimates of Hartmann et al. (2017). It is also consistent with the argument 
that higher complexity provide individuals with more occupational choices, learning 
opportunities, a higher sustained income, a flat hierarchical occupational structure, thus 
lowering income inequality. The potential determinants of inequality, including trade 
openness, FDI, education and institutions, are statistically insignificant when ECI is employ to 
explain cross-country differences in inequality. This shows that economic complexity is a 
strong predictor of income inequality across countries.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
Using the cross-country average data from 1980 to 2014 for 96 countries, this paper 
provides empirical support for the validity of the Kuznets proposition after controlling for 
economic complexity. The coefficients for GDP per capita have a positive sign, and are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Also, the estimated coefficients for the squared term of 
GDP per capita are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. Hence, the inverted 
U-shaped curve is recovered, using this sample of 96 countries. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Table 2 examines the effects of the interaction between economic complexity and human 
capital on income inequality. The effects of ECI on inequality at the mean value of the log of 
schooling can be computed from column (1) of Table 1 as: 
                                                          
11 Specifically, we use the third and the fourth lags of the endogenous variables. The number of 
instruments should be ideally smaller than the number of cross-sectional units, which is the number of 
countries in our context (Roodman, 2009). We use this criterion to select the appropriate lags. 
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𝜕𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼
𝜕𝐸𝐶𝐼
= 0.191 − 0.110𝐿𝑛(𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔) = 0.191 − 0.110 ∗ 1.932 = −0.021 
This is consistent with our findings in Table 1. Hence, it further supports the negative 
correlation between economic complexity and inequality, using the OLS estimation method. 
The estimated coefficients of interaction terms between complexity and human capital are 
found to be negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The strong significance and 
the negative sign of the estimated coefficients suggest that human capital considerably bolsters 
the negative effect of complexity on income inequality. Our results are robust to using different 
measures of human capital. Countries that manage to complement social policies, which 
improve the quality of human capital, with industrial policies, which diversify toward more 
sophisticated products, will have a lower level of income inequality. Hartmann et al. (2016) 
argue that high-performing Asian economies (HPAEs) such as South Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand have managed to diversify their economic structures into more complex industrial 
products, creating wider employment opportunities. At the same time, they invested 
substantially in education that prepared workers for new occupational choices. Consequently, 
those countries maintained a lower level of income inequality from 1970 until 2010, along with 
growing economic complexity. By combining social and economic policies, the benefits of 
their growing level of economic complexity were spread into the whole society, evidenced by 
decreasing income inequality (Stiglitz, 1996).  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
We further perform different regressions for two sub-samples of developing and developed 
countries. It is interesting to observe that the estimated coefficients for secondary education 
and its interaction with complexity are noticeably higher than for tertiary education as shown 
in Table 2 and 3. Estimation results indicate that secondary education has much stronger 
interaction effects on inequality than tertiary education, in both high-income countries and low- 
and middle-income countries. More importantly, the interaction between education and 
complexity has a positive effect on inequality in high-income countries, but a negative effect 
in developing countries. Hence, the negative joint effect when pooling data across countries 
(as shown in Table 2) is mainly driven by the group of developing economies. The reasons for 
this are various.  
First, the link between income inequality and education expansion, measured by increasing 
years of schooling or by decreasing education inequality, has been subject to numerous 
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empirical tests. Barro (2000) considers the effects of different levels of education on income 
inequality, and finds that secondary education is negatively associated with inequality while 
tertiary education is positively correlated with inequality. Examining the distributional 
implications of education in Greece, Tsakloglou and Antoninis (1999) find that public transfers 
in primary and secondary education are associated with a more equal distribution of income, 
while transfers in tertiary education have limited distributional effects. The explanation for 
such a finding is that investments in secondary education benefit the middle quintiles (the 
majority of households) while the impact of tertiary education is found only in the top quintiles. 
Hence, transfers in secondary education have much higher and stronger effects in decreasing 
inequality than transfers in tertiary education. Furthermore, stronger distributional effects of 
secondary education are found in other studies (Abdullah et al., 2015).  
Second, these results are not surprising when considering that the majority of the sample 
consists of developing countries. Over recent decades, most developing economies with high 
economic growth rates have experienced rapid structural transformation, which is dominated 
by resource reallocation away from agriculture and toward manufacturing. According to Atkin 
(2016), this industrialization process is mainly driven by low-skill manufacturing exports. 
Thus, there has been a growing demand for low-skill manufacturing labor in most developing 
countries. To the extent that an improvement in secondary education responds to this increased 
demand and improves productive capabilities, the joint effect of secondary education and 
complexity is more pronounced in developing countries. The negative interaction effect is also 
mainly driven by developing countries.  
Third, Zhu and Li (2017) argue that the stronger interaction effect of secondary education 
in developing countries can be explained by looking at the method of computing the economic 
complexity index. The first step of measuring the complexity level is to select products in 
which a country can produce and export with revealed comparative advantage. In developing 
countries, it is far more common to reveal advantage in low-skill manufacturing and labor-
intensive production activities, which require lower levels of education. Therefore, the labor 
market of developing economies is likely to absorb workers with secondary education. Also, 
complexity can be bolstered by employing workers with secondary education in the expanding 
industries.  
Finally, the effect on income distribution of the interaction between complexity and human 
capital is found to be positive in high-income countries. This means that the higher quality of 
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education, together with growing economic complexity, drives widening income disparities. 
While the structural transformation in developing countries has been driven by the resource 
movement toward manufacturing, it has been accompanied by service-based activities in 
developed economies. Wage variation in the manufacturing sector is usually lower than that in 
the service sector. Meanwhile, manufacturing jobs are characterized by the presence of labor 
unions and collective bargaining that act as an impediment to worsening income inequality. 
Hence, the structural transformation in high-income countries from labor-intensive 
manufacturing to more service-intensive activities is associated with higher inequality. 
Furthermore, we argue this could be due to the saturation of high-quality human capital in 
developed countries. Highly complex economies usually require a smaller workforce as 
industries tend to be more highly automated and technologically advanced. Therefore, workers 
with highly advanced skills or advanced degrees will be rewarded by significantly higher 
income, but these industries also need fewer workers to drive the value chain. Therefore, higher 
inequality and income differences should be seen between workers with exceptional skills or 
advanced degrees compared with others. This suggests that the interaction effects of economic 
complexity and education on income inequality, as argued before, is more important in 
developing countries than in advanced countries.  
We also test whether the quality of institutions magnifies the correlation between 
economic complexity and income inequality. Indeed, institutions act as a catalyst for new 
economic activities (North, 1990). They are also beneficial for investment in productive 
capabilities, including new technologies and skills (North, 1990), and the so-called “self-
discovery” process (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). In addition, the quality of institutions 
promotes innovations through creating entrepreneurship, and disseminating knowledge and 
technologies (Schumpeter, 1934; Brown, 1999). Countries with better institutions, therefore, 
acquire productive capabilities faster, thus improving their economic complexity and income 
distribution. The estimated coefficients are significantly negative, supporting this argument. 
However, they are statistically insignificant when we include the interaction between human 
capital and ECI in the model. This indicates that human capital is the most important factor 
that interacts with complexity to affect inequality.12 
4.2. System GMM estimates 
                                                          
12 To conserve space, we do not report the results of the interaction between ECI and institutions. 
However, they are available upon request.  
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Estimation results of the dynamic panel data, using a system GMM estimator, are presented in 
Table 4. The failure to reject the Hansen J-test substantiates the model specifications and the 
validity of our instruments. However, the AR(2) test shows that the error terms are serially 
correlated. For this reason, we re-estimate our model, using an adjusted instrument set. The 
AR(3) test indicates the absence of serial correlation in the error term, validating our 
instruments.13  
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
The estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable are relatively large in terms of 
magnitude, and are highly significant as shown in Table 4. This implies that income inequality 
shows high time persistence, which further justifies the relevance of the system GMM 
estimation method.    
The estimated coefficients of ECI are positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This implicates that an immediate increase in economic complexity provokes higher income 
inequality. Specifically, a one-unit of standard deviation of complexity is associated with 
approximately a 0.02-unit increase in inequality, as shown in column 6 of Table 4. It should be 
noted that this result is opposite to that of Hartmann et al. (2017), as discussed below.  
Although the estimated coefficients of the lagged ECI are not statistically significant in 
several models, they are statistically significant at the 5% level after we control for schooling. 
Following Wooldridge (2013, page 635), we compute the long-run effects of an increase in 
economic complexity on income inequality, given the estimated coefficients in column 6 of 
Table 4.14 
                                                          
13 We used the third and fourth lags of endogenous instruments to avoid the problem of instrument 
proliferation in system GMM estimator. This choice is also motivated by the criterion that the number 
of instruments should be ideally smaller than the number of countries (Roodman, 2009) and the AR(3) 
test results. Our main findings are robust to limiting lags of endogenous variables used as instruments.  
14 We can re-write Eq. [7] as:  
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡 − 𝛽1𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡−1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑡−1 + β4lnGDPPCi,t + β5lnGDPPCSQi,t +
β6Schoolingi,t + β7Populationi,t + δi + γt + εi,t . 
This is equivalent to:  
𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡(1 − 𝛽1𝐿) = 𝛽0+𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑡(𝛽2 + 𝛽3𝐿) + β4lnGDPPCi,t + β5lnGDPPCSQi,t + β6Schoolingi,t +
β7Populationi,t + δi + γt + εi,t  where L denote the lag operator (i.e. L𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡=𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡−1).  
In long-run equilibrium, L=1 (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡=𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡−1). Hence, 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼𝑡(1 − 𝛽1) = 𝛽0+𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑡(𝛽2 + 𝛽3) +
β4lnGDPPCi,t + β5lnGDPPCSQi,t + β6Schoolingi,t + β7Populationi,t + δi + γt + εi,t . 
The partial effects of an increase in ECI on inequality is calculated as below: 
𝜕𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼
𝜕𝐸𝐶𝐼
|
𝐿𝑅
=
𝛽
2
+ 𝛽
3
1 − 𝛽
1
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𝜕𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼
𝜕𝐸𝐶𝐼
|
𝐿𝑅
=
𝛽2 + 𝛽3
1 − 𝛽1
=
0.022 − 0.014
1 − 0.931
= 0.116 > 0 
Hence, a long-term increase in economic complexity is associated with an increase in the 
degree of income inequality. Specifically, a one-unit increase in ECI in the long-run results in 
a 0.116-unit increase in inequality. The magnitude of the long-term effects, however, are larger 
than the short-term effects.  
Our results suggest that when the economy manages to diversify its production activities 
and engage in the production of more complex products, the distribution of income becomes 
less equal. This empirical finding supports the arguments of Hodgson (2003) and Hartmann 
(2014). In particular, an increase in economic complexity is achieved when a country acquires 
new productive capabilities that allow it to make more complex products. On the one hand, this 
process brings about new employment and education opportunities, which tends to lower 
inequality. On the other hand, it can also create a situation of “winner-take-all” that intensifies 
income inequality within and between countries because low-skilled workers and low-income 
countries are at a greater disadvantage. Hodgson (2003) argues that the growing diversity and 
sophistication of products are associated with the emergence of new specialisms. Hartmann 
(2014) refers to this as the “creative-destruction” process in which new specialisms emerge and 
replace outdated ones. Workers who have advanced and transferable skills can learn quickly, 
and are exposed to less risk when adapting to this structural change. Hence, they tend to attract 
an economic premium.  
Furthermore, economic complexity exacerbates inequality when it results in the problem 
of structural dependence and underdevelopment of a country’s less developed areas (Myrdal, 
1957; Hartmann, 2014). The growing diversity of complex industries in developed regions 
attracts inflows of qualified workers from a “periphery” of impoverished and underdeveloped 
areas, enriching the complexity levels of the former while worsening the economic issues of 
the latter. Consequently, the income disparity among regions increases. If we consider the issue 
from a cross-national perspective, growing complexity, which might be facilitated by 
automation and artificial intelligence, lowers the demand for low-skilled jobs in developing 
countries. This happens because developed nations are bringing back manufacturing and 
industrial jobs in which low-income countries traditionally have a comparative advantage. 
Thus, income disparity between countries escalates. 
                                                          
See Wooldridge (2013) for discussions on the long-run propensity in distributed lag models. 
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It is important to compare our empirical findings with those of Hartmann et al. (2017). The 
authors perform a cross-country fixed-effects panel regression with 10-year averages from 
1963 to 2008, and find that an increase in complexity lowers inequality. We also estimate a 
static panel data, using 5-year and 10-year averages, but employ another dataset of income 
inequality with the broadest coverage of countries and years. Fixed-effects estimates show that 
the estimated coefficients of ECI is consistently positive, but they are statistically insignificant 
in some cases.15 However, as discussed earlier, fixed-effects estimates may be biased due to 
the potential endogeneity of complexity and the persistence of the dependent variable. 
Addressing these problems, we estimate a dynamic panel data, using a system GMM estimator. 
Furthermore, our paper also differs from Hartmann et al. (2017) in demonstrating that an 
increase in economic complexity is associated with higher degrees of inequality in both short- 
and long-run, using the dynamic panel data estimation. The shortcoming of Hartmann et al. 
(2017) is that this paper does not include the lagged ECI, thus failing to capture the long-run 
effects of an increase in complexity on inequality. Using a new dataset of inequality with the 
broadest coverage of countries and years, we find that an increase in economic complexity is 
associated with a higher level of income inequality, controlling for the potential endogeneity 
bias.  
To sum up, we estimate a dynamic panel data, using a system GMM estimator. Results 
show that an increase in economic complexity results in higher income inequality in both short- 
and long-run. The magnitude of the long-run effects is larger than that of the short-run effects.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper attempts to shed some light on the relationship between economic complexity and 
income inequality. In doing so, we estimate cross-country OLS regressions and a dynamic 
panel data model.  
The cross-sectional OLS regressions show that countries with higher economic complexity 
enjoy lower levels of income inequality. This finding indicates that economic complexity is a 
strong predictor of income inequality. Furthermore, human capital magnifies the negative 
correlation between complexity and inequality. Countries endowed with better and improved 
human capital are able to enhance economic structures. Consequently, this reinforces the 
distributional effects of economic complexity, leaving them with a lower level of inequality. 
                                                          
15 Fixed-effects estimation results are not reported to save space, but are available upon request.  
19 
 
We also demonstrate that secondary education plays a more important role in interacting with 
economic complexity, relative to tertiary education. Although these findings document a strong 
correlation, they do not necessarily imply causality because of potential endogeneity concerns.  
Motivated by the possible endogeneity bias of OLS regressions, we estimate a dynamic 
panel data to consider the time-varying effects and address the potential endogeneity bias, using 
a system GMM estimator. We also include economic complexity and its lagged term to capture 
the short- and long-term effects. We find that an increase in economic complexity is associated 
with a higher level of income inequality, which is in contrast with the OLS estimates. This is 
consistent with the notion that when the economy experiences structural changes toward more 
sophisticated products, the degree of income inequality increases. In particular, the estimated 
coefficients of lagged economic complexity are significantly negative. The calculation of the 
long-term effects shows a positive correlation between an increase in complexity and the level 
of inequality. Hence, an increase in economic complexity is associated with higher income 
inequality.  
20 
 
Reference 
Abdullah, A., Doucouliagos, H. & Manning, E. (2015) "Does Education Reduce Income 
Inequality? A Meta-Regression Analysis", Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 29, No. 
2, pp. 301-316. 
Ahluwalia, M. S. (1976) "Income Distribution and Development: Some Stylized Facts", 
American Economic Review, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp. 128-135. 
Alesina, A. & Perotti, R. (1996) "Income Distribution, Political Instability, and Investment", 
European Economic Review, Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 1203-1228. 
Arellano, M. & Bond, S. (1991) "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo 
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations", Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 277-297. 
Arellano, M. & Bover, O. (1995) "Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of 
Error-Components Models", Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 29-51. 
Atkin, D. (2016) "Endogenous Skill Acquisition and Export Manufacturing in Mexico", 
American Economic Review, Vol. 106, No. 8, pp. 2046-85. 
Balassa, B. (1965) "Trade Liberalisation and “Revealed” Comparative Advantage", 
Manchester School, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 99-123. 
Banerjee, A. V. & Duflo, E. (2003) "Inequality and Growth: What Can the Data Say?", Journal 
of Economic Growth, Vol. 8, No. 3, pp. 267-299. 
Barro, R. J. (2000) "Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries", Journal of Economic 
Growth, Vol. 5, No. 1, pp. 5-32. 
Barro, R. J. (2008) "Inequality and Growth Revisited". Asian Development Bank: ADB 
Working paper series on regional economic integration. 
Barro, R. J. & Lee, J. W. (2013) "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 
1950–2010", Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 104, pp. 184-198. 
Benabou, R. (1996) "Inequality and Growth", NBER Macroeconomics Annual, Vol. 11, pp. 11-
74. 
Berg, A. G. & Ostry, J. D. (2013) "Inequality and Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of the 
Same Coin?", International Organisations Research Journal, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 77-99. 
Blundell, R. & Bond, S. (1998) "Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel 
Data Models", Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, No. 1, pp. 115-143. 
Brown, P. (1999) "Globalisation and the Political Economy of High Skills", Journal of 
Education and Work, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 233-251. 
21 
 
Caldarelli, G., Cristelli, M., Gabrielli, A., Pietronero, L., Scala, A. & Tacchella, A. (2012) "A 
Network Analysis of Countries’ Export Flows: Firm Grounds for the Building Blocks 
of the Economy", Plos One, Vol. 7, No. 10, pp. e47278. 
Cameron, A. C. & Trivedi, P. K. (2005) Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chenery, H. B. & Taylor, L. (1968) "Development Patterns: Among Countries and over Time", 
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 391-416. 
Constantine, C. (2017) "Economic Structures, Institutions and Economic Performance", 
Journal of Economic Structures, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-18. 
Costanza, R., Hart, M., Talberth, J. & Posner, S. (2009) "Beyond GDP: The Need for New 
Measures of Progress", The Pardee Papers. 
Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Khomenko, A. & Svensson, R. (2016) "The Quality 
of Government Basic Dataset, Version Jan16", University of Gothenburg: The Quality 
of Government Institute. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government 
Institute. 
Daude, C., Nagengast, A. & Perea, J. R. (2016) "Productive Capabilities: An Empirical 
Analysis of Their Drivers", Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 
Vol. 25, No. 4, pp. 504-535. 
Deininger, K. & Squire, L. (1996) "A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality", World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 565-591. 
Easterly, W. (2007) "Inequality Does Cause Underdevelopment: Insights from a New 
Instrument", Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 84, No. 2, pp. 755-776. 
Felipe, J., Kumar, U., Abdon, A. & Bacate, M. (2012) "Product Complexity and Economic 
Development", Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 36-68. 
Galbraith, J. K. (2007) "Global Inequality and Global Macroeconomics", Journal of Policy 
Modeling, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 587-607. 
Hartmann, D. (2014) Economic Complexity and Human Development: How Economic 
Diversification and Social Networks Affect Human Agency and Welfare, New York: 
Routledge. 
Hartmann, D., Guevara, M. R., Jara-Figueroa, C., Aristarán, M. & Hidalgo, C. A. (2017) 
"Linking Economic Complexity, Institutions, and Income Inequality", World 
Development, Vol. 93, No. Supplement C, pp. 75-93. 
22 
 
Hartmann, D., Jara-Figueroa, C., Guevara, M., Simoes, A. & Hidalgo, C. S. A. (2016) "The 
Structural Constraints of Income Inequality in Latin America", Integration & Trade 
Journal No. 40. 
Hausmann, R., Hidalgo, C. A., Bustos, S., Coscia, M., Simoes, A. & Yildirim, M. A. (2014) 
The Atlas of Economic Complexity: Mapping Paths to Prosperity, Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Hausmann, R., Hwang, J. & Rodrik, D. (2007) "What You Export Matters", Journal of 
Economic Growth, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1-25. 
Hausmann, R. & Rodrik, D. (2003) "Economic Development as Self-Discovery", Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp. 603-633. 
Hidalgo, C. (2015) Why Information Grows: The Evolution of Order, from Atoms to 
Economies, New York: Basic Books. 
Hidalgo, C. A. & Hausmann, R. (2009) "The Building Blocks of Economic Complexity", 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Vol. 106, No. 26, pp. 10570-10575. 
Hodgson, G. M. (2003) "Capitalism, Complexity, and Inequality", Journal of Economic Issues, 
Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 471-478. 
Kaldor, N. (1967) Strategic Factors in Economic Development, New York: Cornell University 
Press. 
Kurita, K. & Kurosaki, T. (2011) "Dynamics of Growth, Poverty and Inequality: A Panel 
Analysis of Regional Data from Thailand and the Philippines", Asian Economic 
Journal, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 3-33. 
Kuznets, S. (1955) "Economic Growth and Income Inequality", American Economic Review, 
Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 1-28. 
Kuznets, S. (1973) "Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 247-258. 
Kuznets, S. & Murphy, J. T. (1966) Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread, 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Lewis, W. (1955) The Theory of Economic Growth, London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Myrdal, G. (1957) Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions, London: Gerald 
Duckworth. 
North, D. (1990) Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
Cambridge University Press. 
23 
 
Palma, J. G. (2011) "Homogeneous Middles Vs. Heterogeneous Tails, and the End of the 
‘Inverted-U’: It's All About the Share of the Rich", Development and Change, Vol. 42, 
No. 1, pp. 87-153. 
Perotti, R. (1996) "Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say", Journal 
of Economic growth, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 149-187. 
Persson, T. & Tabellini, G. (1994) "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?", American Economic 
Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 600-621. 
Romer, D. (2012) Advanced Macroeconomics, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Roodman, D. (2009) "A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments", Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 71, No. 1, pp. 135-158. 
Rostow, W. W. (1959) "The Stages of Economic Growth", Economic History Review, Vol. 12, 
No. 1, pp. 1-16. 
Sbardella, A., Pugliese, E. & Pietronero, L. (2017) "Economic Development and Wage 
Inequality: A Complex System Analysis", PloS One, Vol. 12, No. 9, pp. e0182774. 
Schumpeter, J. A. (1934) The Theory of Economic Development – an Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle, Cambridge, MA: Havard University 
Press. 
Stiglitz, J. E. (1996) "Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle", World Bank Research 
Observer, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 151-177. 
Stiglitz, J. E., Sen, A. & Fitoussi, J.-P. (2010) "Report by the Commission on the Measurement 
of Economic Performance and Social Progress". Paris: Commission on the 
Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress. 
Sweet, C. M. & Eterovic Maggio, D. S. (2015) "Do Stronger Intellectual Property Rights 
Increase Innovation?", World Development, Vol. 66, No. Supplement C, pp. 665-677. 
Tsakloglou, P. & Antoninis, M. (1999) "On the Distributional Impact of Public Education: 
Evidence from Greece", Economics of Education Review, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 439-452. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2013) Introductory Econometrics: A Modern Approach, Mason: South-
Western Cengage Learning. 
Zhu, S. & Fu, X. (2013) "Drivers of Export Upgrading", World Development, Vol. 51, pp. 221-
233. 
Zhu, S. & Li, R. (2017) "Economic Complexity, Human Capital and Economic Growth: 
Empirical Research Based on Cross-Country Panel Data", Applied Economics, Vol. 49, 
No. 38, pp. 3815-3828. 
24 
 
Zweimüller, J. (2000) "Schumpeterian Entrepreneurs Meet Engel's Law: The Impact of 
Inequality on Innovation-Driven Growth", Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
pp. 185-206. 
 
  
25 
 
Table 1. Basic OLS estimates of the effects of economic complexity on income inequality. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES GINI GINI GINI GINI GINI 
      
ECI -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.046*** -0.045*** -0.044*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) 
Ln(GDPPC) 0.280*** 0.269*** 0.274*** 0.275*** 0.275*** 
 (0.065) (0.075) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Ln(GDPPCSQ) -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln(Schooling) -0.028 -0.027 -0.025 -0.024 -0.025 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
Rule of law  -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
Ln(Population)   0.004 0.003 0.003 
   (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Trade)    -0.006 -0.009 
    (0.020) (0.024) 
Ln(FDI)     0.002 
     (0.011) 
Constant -0.732*** -0.694** -0.794** -0.742** -0.738** 
 (0.259) (0.288) (0.324) (0.354) (0.358) 
      
Observations 96 95 95 95 95 
R-squared 0.477 0.481 0.485 0.485 0.486 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2. OLS estimates of interaction effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES GINI GINI GINI 
    
ECI 0.191*** -0.001 -0.071*** 
 (0.042) (0.022) (0.019) 
Ln(GDPPC) 0.156** 0.192*** 0.192** 
 (0.060) (0.070) (0.078) 
Ln(GDPPCSQ) -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.011** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(Schooling) -0.077***   
 (0.026)   
ECI*Ln(Schooling) -0.110***   
 (0.020)   
Ln(Secondary)  -0.042**  
  (0.017)  
ECI*Ln(Secondary)  -0.042**  
  (0.016)  
Ln(Tertiary)   -0.018 
   (0.013) 
ECI*Ln(Tertiary)   -0.023** 
   (0.011) 
Constant -0.092 -0.379 -0.428 
 (0.243) (0.295) (0.351) 
    
Observations 96 96 96 
R-squared 0.578 0.512 0.502 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. OLS estimates (by sub-samples). 
VARIABLES 
High-income countries Low- and middle-income countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
GINI GINI GINI GINI 
     
ECI -0.269*** -0.015 0.043** -0.091** 
 (0.055) (0.017) (0.019) (0.038) 
Ln(GDPPC) 0.536 0.434 0.247* 0.182 
 (0.503) (0.602) (0.139) (0.145) 
Ln(GDPPCSQ) -0.027 -0.021 -0.014 -0.010 
 (0.025) (0.030) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(Secondary) -0.140***  -0.082***  
 (0.028)  (0.021)  
ECI*Ln(Secondary) 0.171***  -0.085***  
 (0.041)  (0.021)  
Ln(Tertiary)  -0.075***  -0.041** 
  (0.027)  (0.017) 
ECI*Ln(Tertiary)  0.061**  -0.047*** 
  (0.023)  (0.016) 
Constant -2.081 -1.877 -0.579 -0.439 
 (2.519) (3.031) (0.528) (0.571) 
     
Observations 36 36 58 58 
R-squared 0.607 0.544 0.257 0.198 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. Two-step system GMM estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES GINI GINI GINI GINI GINI GINI 
       
GINIt-1 0.996*** 0.975*** 0.975*** 0.942*** 0.969*** 0.931*** 
 (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.026) (0.030) (0.025) 
ECI 0.010** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.021*** 0.009** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
ECIt-1  -0.009  -0.014**  -0.014** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Ln(GDPPC) -0.007 -0.005 -0.033 -0.032** -0.032 -0.039* 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.025) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ln(GDPPCSQ) 0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(Schooling)   0.003 0.008 0.007 0.011* 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Population)     -0.001 -0.001 
     (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.055 0.056 0.177 0.180*** 0.190* 0.226** 
 (0.062) (0.061) (0.109) (0.062) (0.107) (0.101) 
       
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 633 633 582 582 582 582 
Number of countries 113 113 98 98 98 98 
AR(2) (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(3) (p-value) 0.407 0.680 0.503 0.729 0.479 0.787 
Hansen test (p-
value) 
0.597 0.510 0.391 0.718 0.775 0.643 
No. of instruments  57 92 71 82 58 82 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 
Table A1. List of countries  
Low- and middle- income countries High-income countries 
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Botswana, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Lao PRD, Lebanon, 
Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaysia, 
Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Morocco, Namibia, Mozambique, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, 
Russia, Senegal, Serbia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), 
Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and 
Tobago, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay. 
Note: the classification of country groups is based on World Bank’s definitions 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519  
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Table A2. Summary statistics of variables (OLS regressions) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GINI 109 0.380943 0.083856 0.230411 0.57253 
ECI 109 0.077387 0.951225 -2.04546 2.350117 
Ln(GDPPC) 109 8.570385 1.40703 5.540155 11.20966 
Ln(GDPPCSQ) 109 75.41308 24.20833 30.69332 125.6566 
Schooling 96 7.462445 2.578148 1.214192 12.51064 
Secondary 96 2.499143  1.225113 0.132902 5.297678 
Tertiary  96 0.352094 0.264049 0.008360 1.299796 
Trade 109 78.76388 45.2895 21.35973 355.3419 
FDI 109 3.675215 3.722337 0.123863 27.03412 
Population 109 4.99E+07 1.54E+08 905957.1 1.21E+09 
Rule of law 108 0.123102 1.025547 -1.91632 2.100273 
Table A3. Summary statistics of variables (panel data regressions) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GINI 749 0.379715 0.085317 0.206 0.58384 
ECI 749 0.151807 0.996357 -2.37329 2.544056 
Population 749 5.56E+07 1.59E+08 660450.6 1.35E+09 
Ln(GDPPC) 749 8.591261 1.442885 5.255596 11.40545 
Ln(GDPPCSQ) 749 75.8889 24.71798 27.62129 130.0842 
Schooling 683 7.283101 2.821076 0.727634 13.18264 
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Table A4. List of variables and data sources 
Variables Description Data source 
Period 
OLS 
(average value) 
System GMM 
(5-year average, 
with gaps) 
GINI Estimate of GINI index of inequality using 
household disposable income  
Standardized World Income 
Inequality 
1980-2014 1965-2014 
ECI Economic Complexity index MIT’s Observatory of 
Economic Complexity 
(atlas.media.mit.edu) 
1980-2014 1965-2014 
GDPPC GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
database 
1980-2014 1965-2014 
GDPPCSQ The square of GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
database 
1980-2014 1965-2014 
Schooling Average years of schooling Barro and Lee (2013) 1980-2010 1965-2010, 
with gaps 
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Secondary Average years of secondary schooling  Barro and Lee (2013) 1980-2010 1965-2010, 
with gaps 
Tertiary Average years of tertiary schooling Barro and Lee (2013) 1980-2010 1965-2010, 
with gaps 
Trade  The sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
database 
1980-2014 1965-2014 
FDI The net inflows of foreign direct investment as a 
percentage of GDP 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
database 
1980-2014 1965-2014 
Population  The total population (in millions) World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
database 
1980-2014 1965-2014 
Rule of law This index comprises of various indicators which 
capture the extent to which different agents of 
society have confidence in and abide by its rules 
The quality of government 
basic dataset Dahlberg et al. 
(2016) 
2009 N/A 
 
